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thE shadows  
of a utopia
lecture
remembering communism in Europe, almost two disjoint cul-
tures, with no relation to each other. The first way is commemo-
rative and retributive — it is backward looking. The second way 
is affirmative and reconstructive — it is forward looking. More 
precisely, the first way looks at the past of communist utopia as a 
past utopia, a utopia that has been here, has left its mark, and is 
now gone for good. This way is concerned with the burdens and 
liabilities that the passing of communism through the world has 
bequeathed us. The second way looks at the past of communist 
utopia as a failure to realize the utopia’s full potential, as some-
thing that never fully arrived. This way is concerned with the past 
only as a signpost for our still bright communist future.
thE BACkwArD-lookIng culture developed almost exclusively in 
Eastern Europe, the place where communism reigned for four 
decades. Since 1989, people engaged with communism in Eastern 
Europe in a variety of ways, but all were backward looking. Com-
munist ideology has been critically investigated, legal restitution 
and retribution have been sought, political lustration attempted, 
victims rehabilitated, memorials and museums built.
Of course, many of these things have been undertaken despite 
the resistance of the former communist nomenklatura and their 
heirs, who remain influential in many post-communist countries 
to this day. But not even these political forces base their legiti-
macy on their communist or socialist roots. (The G, the successor 
of East Germany’s ruling SED, is a major exception.)
In contrast, there are those who still enjoy dreaming the 
dream, thinking of communism as the right hypothesis. While 
writing these lines, I am sitting in a café in Brussels. On the wall 
wenty-five years ago, communism, the political system 
dominant in Eastern Europe, collapsed. Two years 
later, in 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved. The 
People’s Republic of China remained the sole commu-
nist power, but throughout the 1990s its anti-capitalist party line 
was watered down through the introduction of market-oriented 
reforms. Today, only one country can be said to be truly commu-
nist: North Korea. Communism, in the 1980s a mighty geopolitical 
force holding half of Europe and roughly one third of the world’s 
population in its grip, is today confined to an internationally iso-
lated prison state, one of the poorest countries on the planet.
How are we to remember the past of a utopia? By recount-
ing the utopian dream? Or maybe by still dreaming the dream, 
hoping for it to come true? After all, as Alain Badiou puts it in his 
book The Communist Hypothesis,1 “Communism is [still] the right 
hypothesis”, and those who disagree “resign themselves to the 
market economy, to parliamentary democracy” — the true evils 
of our time, in Badiou’s eyes.
But was communism just a dream, just a hypothesis? Did it not 
affect many people? Were not millions of lives destroyed in its 
name? According to The Black Book of Communism,2 communism 
claimed about 100 million victims around the globe, includ-
ing some 65 million in Mao’s China and 20 million in the Soviet 
Union. Well, one might say: Communism is a beautiful dream, 
but it does not work in practice. But what sort of beauty are we 
supposed to attribute to a dream that, when forced upon reality, 
turns into a nightmare? The merit of a political vision needs to be 
judged primarily by what it actually achieves.
Since 1989, we have witnessed two quite different ways of 
north Korea is a communist country – the only one? cuba still exists of course. 
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The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski once wrote, “Marx-
ism has been the greatest fantasy of our century”.3 Marxism 
was of course the underlying ideology of all communist states, a 
comprehensive theory of human society, history, and economics, 
purporting not only to explain our past, but also to predict and 
determine that the future will bring a classless, egalitarian com-
munist society. This perfect society, in which the exploitation of 
man by his fellow men would cease to exist, was to be achieved, 
according to Marx, by the proletariat, the driving force of the 
redemption of humanity, and essentially through the abolition of 
private property (a phrase Marx himself used to summarize com-
munism in The Communist Manifesto)4.
In onE SEnSE, Marxism, or communism, was indeed a fantasy, 
since its utopian project was never realized. But in another sense 
it was a very real political project pursued by many countries. If 
we compare the real achievements of communist states with the 
predictions found in Marx, Engels, and Lenin, communism failed 
in a political sense. Not only did the classless communist society 
never arrive, but the standard of living in communist states was 
considerably lower than in capitalist states, and eventually com-
munist regimes came to an end.
in front of me is a poster displaying the hammer and sickle, a 
hand raising a rifle, and a Red Army soldier with a pistol. At my 
own university, I have seen students wearing T-shirts portraying 
communist leaders such as Stalin and Mao, two of the greatest 
mass murderers in history, as cool party guests. In Lyon you can 
visit a restaurant called À KGB, which describes itself as “un lieu 
authentique et mythique, entre tradition et modernité, avec un 
dépaysement garanti” (“an authentic, mythical place, both tra-
ditional and modern, guaranteed to whisk you away from your 
familiar surroundings”. This is particularly thoughtless if we re-
member that the roughly 18 million Russians who ended up in the 
Siberian slave camps had also been “whisked away to unfamiliar 
surroundings”). Such restaurants and bars exist elsewhere in the 
Western world (even here in Stockholm). Years ago, I asked the 
manager of À KGB whether he knew that Stalin, who is displayed 
on a poster as a cool guy wearing headphones, personally signed 
thousands of death warrants. His answer was, “Oh, but we are 
not making a political statement. It’s all just fun.” Fun it may be, 
but no restaurant manager in Western Europe would dare to 
open a Gestapo-themed nightclub or put up a poster of Himmler 
and the SS runes.
These examples show that communism has become part of 
our freewheeling Western cultural imagination. As 1989 slips into 
the past, communism is once again gaining a sort of romantic 
prominence among more educated audiences, especially given 
the influence of neo-communist authors such as Slavoj Žižek, 
Alain Badiou, and Terry Eagleton. How then are we to remember 
communism? As a dream or a nightmare? As “the right hypoth-
esis” or as a terrible hypothesis?
ILLUSTRATION: MOA THELANDER
“ in one sense, mArxism, 
or communism, wAs 
indeed A fAnTAsY, 
since iTs uToPiAn 
ProJecT wAs never 
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defense of the conquests of democracy against the internal and 
external enemies” (Art. II). The decree also stipulated the death 
penalty for anti-communist activities (Art. VII:2).8
SEConD, thE mASS mEDIA were taken over and became propagan-
da tools, especially radio, given its extensive reach in those years. 
Third, various parts of civil society were harassed and eventually 
prohibited, including church and youth organizations, while at 
the same time the Communist Party was strengthened and in 
most cases taken over by party cadres who had been trained for 
this task during the war in special ideology schools. Fourth, eth-
nic cleansing through deportations took place.
These four steps made up the first wave of repression. Then 
came the second, more violent wave. In the two years after the 
war, free elections had taken place in most Eastern European 
countries occupied by the Soviets. A major reason for this is 
simply the fact that the Stalinists had trusted that the propa-
ganda delivered by the mass media would suffice to convince 
the majority of the electorate to vote for their local communist 
party. This, however, did not happen. Astonishingly, no Com-
munist party managed to obtain more than one third of the vote 
in any free election in Eastern Europe. Thus, beginning in 1947, 
free elections were suppressed and one-party rule was installed. 
Moreover, since society was resisting communist rule, more ag-
gressive measures were taken to bring society into conformance 
with Marxist ideology. All forms of opposition were prohibited, 
especially traditional “bourgeois” parties; strict political censor-
ship was instituted; opponents and “enemies of the people” 
were arrested; show trials were held and the convicts executed 
or sent to labor camps; and a system of informers was installed 
to survey and control the population. The net effect of these first 
years of “Stalinization” was that half the continent was effectively 
stripped of basic political and economic rights.
There is something puzzling about this outcome. Marx had 
stated that the proletariat was the engine of historical progress 
and Lenin had added that the Party was the vanguard of the 
proletariat. Both claims were meta-historical claims, stating 
necessary and indubitable truths about the historical direction 
of mankind and its ultimate redemption. Men will become free 
and equal in communism, by necessity, and they will want com-
munism, by necessity. This prediction was an essential part of 
Today, there is a popular argument employed to deny that 
communism has been refuted by the failure of the Soviet Union 
and its allies. The Soviet Union, the GDR, the People’s Republic 
of Poland, the Socialist Republic of Romania, etc. were not com-
munist countries, because they were oppressive states. And since 
there never has been a communist state, the argument goes com-
munism has not been refuted by history.
It is not a very good argument. It is not in the interest of a com-
munist to turn his doctrine into a mere irrefutable ideal: commu-
nism would then be comparable to certain religious doctrines; it 
would be removed from the sphere of the science of politics and 
lose its redemptive core, the aim to solve once for all the prob-
lems of human society. In principle, there needs to be a method 
to check whether a certain political system has been realized 
or not, independently of our own political preferences. In other 
words, we must be able to specify descriptive conditions for the re-
alization of a political system. These descriptive conditions must 
be independent of a normative evaluation of the system.
Here is an analogy. An architect announces that he will build 
a house that can resist any earthquake. He finishes his work, an 
earthquake occurs, and the house collapses. The architect can’t 
escape criticism by saying, “This was not the house I intended to 
build, since it was not earthquake-resistant!” This would be a fee-
ble attempt to reject responsibility. Clearly, there are descriptive 
conditions of the house being erected (it is of a certain size, made 
of certain materials, etc.) and we have a “normative” evaluation 
(it is or is not earthquake-resistant). In the case of the house, the 
descriptive conditions are satisfied, but the normative evaluation 
is negative.
SImIlArly, In thE CASE of communism we have descriptive condi-
tions for the establishment of a communist state (abolition of 
private property, dictatorship of the proletariat, one-party rule) 
and a normative evaluation (“the state is or is not an egalitarian 
and just society”). The descriptive conditions of communism 
were certainly satisfied in Eastern Europe: private property was 
nationalized everywhere and the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
represented by the one party, was established. So what is the 
result of the normative evaluation of the societies constructed by 
these measures?
As Anne Applebaum has demonstrated in her recent book Iron 
Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944—1956,5 communism 
was imposed by the new Soviet rulers after the Second World War 
according to a more or less identical pattern, consisting of four 
stages.6
In every country, the NKVD first created a secret police, the 
necessary tool for the subsequent suppression of the opposi-
tion, real and imagined, i.e., any elements in society inimical to 
the communism project. To consider the example of my native 
country, Romania: Here the infamous secret service Securitate 
(officially, the “Security of the People”) was founded by a decree 
(no. 221) as a new organ in the Interior Ministry in August 1948, af-
ter the old Romanian secret service had been infiltrated by Soviet 
agents (Serghei Nikonov, Pantelimon Bondarenko, Alexandru 
Nicolski).7 The task of this new organ was explicitly stated as “the 
fundamentalists are prepared to sacrifice lives in the name of god. communists did so for the Party!
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Wing with detention cells in the former communist prison in Sighet, 
Romania, now a memorial.
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denounced by his housekeeper for possessing a collection of 
watches. The police arrested him. I found an entry on this man in 
a Romanian dictionary about the Romanian victims of Commu-
nist terror, edited by a survivor of Communist prisons, Cicerone 
Ioniţoiu.11 The entry reads:
KANTARIAN, Manuk. Born on December 27, 1892, in Asia 
Minor [Turkey]. Arrested in 1951. Died during detention 
in one of the camps at the Canal, on December 26, 1952.12
The “Canal”: in the early 1950s this was a name of horror, con-
nected with the construction of an artificial shortcut between 
the Danube and the Black Sea. Much of this canal was built by 
political prisoners, slave workers really, people like Manuk Kan-
tarian who had been identified as internal enemies of the com-
munist economy. Manuk, born in Turkey, escaped the Armenian 
genocide in 1915 only to die in a communist camp for the mere 
possession of a collection of watches. Was communism the right 
hypothesis?
Tens of thousands of these slaves were held in labor camps at 
any given time. We don’t know their precise numbers, nor the 
precise numbers of the casualties. But we have a pretty clear 
picture of the inhuman conditions in which they lived and died: 
like the Nazi camps, they have been described by survivors. Here 
is a related description of political prisoners in a Siberian Gulag 
camp:
There behind the barbed wire was a row of creatures, 
distantly reminiscent of human beings [...] there were 
ten of them, skeletons of various sizes covered with 
brown, parchment-like skin, all stripped to the waist, 
with shaved heads and pendulous withered breasts. 
Their only clothing was some pathetic dirty underpants, 
and their shinbones projected from concave circles 
of emptiness. Women! Hunger, heat and hard toil had 
transformed them into dried specimens that still, unac-
countably, clung to the last vestiges of life.13
Many other examples could be given, from many other places. 
One of the worst was the educational camp on the outskirts of the 
Romanian city of Piteşti, where in 1949—1952 a barbaric experi-
ment was undertaken to blur the distinction between victim and 
perpetrator. The experiment was based on the recruitment of in-
mates as torturers and “reeducators” of their fellow inmates, of-
ten their best friends, by various means: beating them senseless, 
forcing them to eat excrement, sexual abuse with anti-Christian 
connotations, and many other such things. Here is the recollec-
tion of an inmate turned into a torturer:
Costache Oprişan was almost a corpse. [Another inmate] 
laid him down, tied up his feet with ropes, called the 
others and myself, and ordered us to beat Oprişan. I was 
handed the club. I stopped thinking, I just beat him. It 
was not the threat that made me hit, but the confusion. I 
was beating the man whom I most treasured, my friend, 
Marxism, derived with the scientific certainty of dialectical mate-
rialism.
But in fact, the “proletariat”, once given the choice, i.e. free 
elections, did not bring the communists to power. The Marxist 
prediction failed. Society displayed a tendency to take a develop-
ment different from what the doctrine was predicting. Given a 
choice, many workers and peasants voted for non-communist 
parties, such as the Peasants’ Party in Romania, the Polish Peo-
ple’s Party, etc. The Communists could have accepted this out-
come and become one of several players in a multi-party system. 
But this would have meant adapting to a reality contradicting 
their ideology, in which there was no room for several political 
parties. Therefore, the Communists had to abolish free elections.
Since no communist government represented the will of the 
people, none was democratically legitimate. Interestingly, this 
fact stood in contradiction to the nominally democratic consti-
tutions the Communists installed. For example, Article 3 of the 
Romanian constitution of 1948 stipulates that all state power ema-
nates from and belongs to the people, and that the people exert 
their power through universal, equal, and secret elections.9
This basic contradiction between the constitution and the will 
of the people on the one hand and the ruling power and ideol-
ogy on the other indicates that there was something paradoxical 
about the communist project. For this was a contradiction arising 
from within the core of the doctrine itself, its claim to bring lib-
eration to all.
BEForE tryIng to UnDErStAnD this paradox, I will first give some 
examples of how the doctrine clashed with reality. One concerns 
my own uncle, also named Edward Kanterian. He was born in 
1950 in Romania and attempted, at the age of 17, to escape over 
the border one night. A few months later, when he would have 
turned 18, his conscription order into the army should have ar-
rived, but it did not. He was in all likelihood shot at the border, 
as thousands were. (Herta Müller describes such a shooting of an 
innocent citizen by Communist guards at the Romanian border in 
her novel The Appointment.)10 The state knew there was no point 
sending a conscription order to a ghost. My family has never 
heard anything from Edward. His name does not appear in any 
archives we have consulted (but there are others, still inacces-
sible). In the Armenian cemetery in Bucharest there is an empty 
grave with his name on it.
Another example, again that of a Romanian Armenian, was 
recently recounted to me by my father. This was the case of a 
man named Kantarian (not related). He was a train conductor 
in a sleeping car. One day during the height of Stalinism, he was 
lecture
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early decree, Lenin also created the Gulag concentration camps, 
which were run by the Cheka. In its first two years alone, and espe-
cially during the Red Terror campaign in 1918, the Cheka executed 
countless “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of the people”, 
with an official death toll of at least 8,000—12,000, although 
plausible estimates have run to 50,000,  250,000, or even higher. 
Under Stalin’s Great Terror campaign in 1937—1938, some 680,000 
“counterrevolutionaries” were killed by the Cheka, according to 
Donald Rayfield’s archival research.19 The Cheka executioners 
were operating in a methodical manner, following quotas for how 
many “enemies” were to be killed in a given region. They did not 
shy away from industrialized mass killing to reach these quotas. In 
some regions, they gassed their victims in 1937, anticipating Nazi 
technology by three years.20 Rayfield writes:
Trucks advertising bread drove around the Urals, pump-
ing exhaust gases into the rear compartment where 
naked prisoners lay roped together in stacks, until their 
loads were ready for the burial pits.21
While such technological precision was a later development of 
the Cheka, the systematic intent to kill opponents was manifest 
from the beginning. Witness this poem from 1921, by a certain 
Alexander Eiduk, a Cheka executioner:
There is no greater joy, no more beautiful music, 
than the cracking of broken lives and bones. 
And that is why I want to write something steadfast 
concerning your verdict: To the wall! Fire!
Eiduk published this poem in an anthology called “The smile of 
the Cheka”. Another Chekist, Martin Lacis, was the editor of a 
journal in which statistics about execution rates were published. 
He wrote in 1921:
The Cheka is the battle organ of the party of the future. 
[The Cheka] annihilates without [a court] trial or it 
isolates from society by imprisoning in concentration 
camps. Its word is law. [...] When interrogating, do not 
seek material evidence or proof of the accused’s words 
or deeds against Soviet power. The first question you 
must ask is: what class does [the accused] belong to, 
what education, upbringing, origin, or profession does 
he have? These questions must determine the accused’s 
fate. This is the meaning and essence of red terror. It 
doesn’t judge the enemy, it strikes him.22
Such passages demonstrate the great extent to which terror was 
part of an official policy, intertwined with the communist ideol-
ogy and institutionalized in the very first stage of communism. 
So the question as to whether Ţurcanu was insane is misleading. 
It makes the communist crimes a matter of individual psychol-
ogy, when in fact they were an expression of the system’s nature 
from the outset, whether in the early Soviet Union after WWI or 
in Romania in the 1950s.
my master, my brother, the man for whom I was ready to 
give my life.14
One of the main leaders of this experiment, Eugen Ţurcanu, ini-
tially a member of the fascist Iron Guard, later a member of the 
Communist Party, kept a meticulous diary of nearly 2000 pages 
about the methods of Marxist “reeducation” and its results.15 
Among these measures were pseudoreligious “sermons” held by 
Ţurcanu. Here is one:
I am Ţurcanu, the first and the last. [...] I am the true 
Gospel. I already have something to write on: your 
corpses. If Christ had gone through these hands, he 
would not have made it to the Cross! He would not have 
been resurrected, there would not have been any Chris-
tianity.16
onE mIght BE tEmptED to say that Ţurcanu was simply insane. But 
were the prison guards, the prison director, and the Securitate 
officers running not just the Piteşti prison, but the whole peni-
tentiary system of camps and prisons spread all over Romania 
also simply mentally ill? According to investigations by Romulus 
Rusan, co-founder of the Sighet Memorial of the Victims of Com-
munism in Romania, there were some 240 detention centers 
in the Stalinist period, in which at least 800,000 people were 
imprisoned at one time or another for political reasons.17 The 
Secretary of the Interior, Teohari Georgescu, reported in 1952 (by 
which time he was himself in prison) that the internal and exter-
nal enemy had been hit hard during his tenure in 1945—1952. The 
Securitate had arrested over “100,000 bandits” and sentenced 
them “for conspiring against our regime”. This was because the 
Securitate’s officers had been vigorously instructed in “class ha-
tred”, as Georgescu stressed.
The blueprint of this pattern of thinking and acting can be 
traced back to the Soviet Union. The Gulag was the huge Soviet 
penitentiary system of slave labor and educational camps for po-
litical opponents. There were some 480 individual camp systems, 
each one, according to Applebaum, “made up of hundreds, even 
thousands of individual camps or lagpunkts, sometimes spread 
out over thousands of square miles of otherwise empty tundra.”18 
The systems held mostly peasants and workers, some 18 million 
between 1929 and 1953 alone, of whom roughly 4.5 million died in 
detention, under conditions almost impossible to imagine.
In December 1917, a few weeks after the Bolshevik takeover, 
Lenin created, by one of his first official decrees, the Cheka, the se-
cret police which later became the NKVD and the KGB. By another 
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Left and right: two posters of the Museum of Communism in Prague. Center: the “Communist 
Party” T-shirt, designed by Tom Burns.
citizen gives up part of his freedom. The 
legalism of such a society entails coercion 
and control, the distinction between per-
sonal life and social role, and thus the sep-
aration between citizens as private sub-
jects, a separation regulated externally by 
power relations and the abstract forces of 
markets and money. Of course, in liberal 
democracies, such legalism is also meant 
to protect citizens’ freedom, dignity, and 
property against others and against the 
state. But for Marx, this legalism is worth-
less, just an expression of capitalist alien-
ation. By contrast, in communism, money 
and property will be abolished, and thus 
any need for mediation and regulation be-
tween individuals and society will disap-
pear. The needs and desires of all citizens 
will be in perfect harmony. “Instead of freedom being conceived 
in the liberal fashion as the private sphere of non-interference 
with others, it becomes the voluntary unity of the individual with 
his fellow men”, writes Kołakowski.27 A communist society will 
embody the principle “From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs”, as Marx wrote in Critique of the Gotha 
Program in 1875.28
(2) The Faustian-Promethean motif is less theoretical. It in-
volves faith in humanity’s unlimited powers of self-creation, in its 
ability to redeem itself. Nota bene: faith in humanity’s powers, not 
the individual’s. The species as a whole is able to progress, with 
the proletariat as its vanguard, even if at the expense of many in-
dividuals. Marx had little concern for our various limitations and 
weaknesses, for human suffering, death, illness, age, or sex, un-
less they were instrumental in the social liberation of the whole 
species. We note in this attitude a disregard for the fragility of 
the individual, something diametrically opposed to the ideals of 
liberal democracy.
(3) The Enlightenment motif relates to Marx’s belief in the ex-
istence of deterministic social laws comparable to the laws of na-
ture. The laws are studied by dialectical materialism, Marx’s ver-
sion of social science. As long as they are not recognized, these 
laws impose themselves on humans with utmost necessity. But 
with the advent of the proletariat, mankind becomes fully con-
scious of these laws, and their necessity turns into our freedom.
BUt EVEn IF thESE three motifs capture key aspects of Marx’s 
doctrines, how do they explain communist terror? After all, Marx 
developed a social philosophy, one open to a variety of interpre-
tations. There is no obvious path from him to Lenin, to Lenin’s 
creation of the Cheka and the Gulag, and then to Stalin’s excesses 
and beyond.
But we need to look more closely. One thing these three motifs 
presuppose or express is an incredible confidence, without any 
sort of actual evidence, in the necessary arrival of a final point in 
mankind’s development, in which all societal evils will be abol-
ished and all conflicts will end. The Romantic motif articulates 
There cannot be any doubt, then, that communism has failed, 
not only on political and economic, but especially on moral 
grounds. Every communist state was a far cry from the paradise 
the doctrine proposed. But what explains the criminal energy un-
der communism, if not individual insanity? Collective insanity? 
That is just a metaphor. We need to explain what united and moti-
vated these “insane” criminals, over different periods of time, in 
different countries. The most plausible answer, in my view, is the 
communist ideology itself, Marxism-Leninism.
SomE mArxIStS wIll protest here, wanting to dissociate Marx’s 
political theory from its Leninist interpretation. For instance, ac-
cording to Marx, the proletariat itself was bound to revolt in the 
course of time.23 But according to Lenin, the real proletariat was 
too weak to grasp the logic of history. It was prone to embrace 
“petty bourgeoisism” and “trade unionism”, and thus succumb 
to forms of capitalism. Another agent was therefore needed, 
professional revolutionaries, the intellectual vanguard of the pro-
letariat — the Bolshevik party.24 It was left to the party to impose 
communism, mercilessly (a favorite word of Lenin’s).
To be sure, Marx’s writings, especially his early ones, are more 
open-ended than Lenin’s political doctrine. But the path from 
Marx to Lenin, and then to Stalin and beyond, is not entirely 
spurious. Arguments to this end have been offered by various 
analysts, including Alain Besançon, Martin Malia, Richard Pipes, 
Hans Kelsen, Helmuth Plessner, and Leszek Kołakowski. I shall 
briefly review Kołakowski’s argument to make my case. It is found 
in Book One of his monumental Main Currents of Marxism, a book 
originally published in Polish in 1976, translated in 1978, and reis-
sued in 2005, but unfortunately on the verge of being forgotten.25
According to Kołakowski, there are three fundamental motifs 
in Marxism: the Romantic motif, the Faustian-Promethean motif, 
and the Enlightenment motif.26
(1) The Romantic motif protests against the advent of modern, 
liberal society. In this society, citizens live in external relations to 
each other, each seeking his advantage, and are prevented from 
harming others by entering into a social contract in which each 
humor is a strategy for survival. To mock the authorities is part of the resistance.
lecture
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(This worry about relapsing into a pre-communist state can be 
seen as one way to understand the phrase “communism and its 
memory”.)
Thus emerged, right from the start, the need of, first, a special 
agency which has full class consciousness and knowledge of the 
march of history, the Party, and, second, an executive branch 
of the Party to weed out the shadows of the past, dissenting in-
dividuals, reactionary forces, petty bourgeois (kulaks and trade 
unionist workers). Thus also emerged the need for the Cheka, 
the Securitate, the Stasi, etc., as an ideological police force, “the 
battle organ of the party of the future” in Martin Lacis’s words, 
applying not the liberal rule of law and individual responsibility, 
but the ideological categories of class struggle. “What class does 
[the accused] belong to?” asked Martin Lacis. The ideological 
police being the articulation of the will of the Party, and the Party 
being the articulation of the necessary march of history, there is 
no room in communism for a confrontation between the rights of 
the individual and the actions of the ideological police, and hence 
no room for the possibility of any wrongdoing by the ideological 
police against the individual. And so the Cheka, as Lacis told us, 
“annihilates without trial” and isolates the class enemy “from so-
ciety by imprisoning [him] in concentration camps”.
This logic explains the continuous presence of oppression 
and surveillance in communist states, the Party’s paranoia, its 
language of war, and the existence of the ideological police. Com-
munism ultimately approximated a war conducted by the Party 
against the recalcitrant reality of human social existence. This 
verdict is troubling, if correct. For it presents communism as an 
amazing and terrible paradox. 
In An ImportAnt, but forgotten essay on communism from 1949, 
the legal theorist Hans Kelsen defined the state as a legal order, 
i.e. an order that “tries to bring about the desired human behav-
ior by providing coercive acts as sanctions for the contrary behav-
ior”.32 According to this definition, every state must necessarily 
involve some degree of coercion, or at least an implicit reference 
to coercion in case the law is violated.
According to Kelsen, a liberal state will involve a minimum of 
coercion, just as much as is required to protect “certain vital in-
terests, such as life and property”.33 A totalitarian state, however, 
will involve a maximum of coercion, providing little or no basis 
for the protection of life and property. Kelsen writes, “National-
ization of economic production [...] is the characteristic measure 
of expanding the scope of a state order towards totalitarianism”.34
And that was the essence of communism. Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin denounced all oppression and coercion, dreaming and 
the main features of this future paradise in the form of a state in 
which all differences in a society are abolished. The Promethean 
motif expresses the voluntarist confidence in bringing about this 
paradise even at the cost of human lives. And the Enlightenment 
motif gives this belief the necessity of a scientific theory, only 
adding to the confidence with which we are supposed to believe 
in it. We have a combination of utopian faith with scientific cer-
tainty, a rather good mixture for fanaticism and social engineer-
ing. Witness Lenin:
The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It 
is comprehensive and harmonious, and provides men 
with an integral world outlook.29
Since the appearance of [Marx’s] Capital — the material-
ist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a 
scientifically proven proposition.30
kołAkowSkI workS oUt this Marx-Lenin lineage in greater detail. 
It all relates to the Romantic motif of a unity of all society, the 
abolition of all antagonisms (property, law, state) and external 
relations between its members. Freedom is hereby determined 
by the degree of unity in a society.31 In a perfectly united society 
(communism), there cannot be any manifestation of the free-
dom of the individual that is not at the same time an expression 
of the unity of society. In particular, since the unity of society is 
represented by the proletariat, there cannot be any individual 
freedom that goes against the actions of the proletariat. If such 
resistance nevertheless arises, it will lead to the only possible 
societal conflict according to Marx, the clash of class interests, 
between two antagonistic political forces, the individual and the 
proletariat. But the communists already know who is and must 
be the winner of this clash: the proletariat. Hence, the clash be-
tween the individual conscience and the proletariat is a relic of 
the past. The dissenting individual conscience has no right to ex-
ist; it cannot exist in communism. To the extent to which it does 
exist, it is a challenge to the communist status quo and needs to 
be suppressed. Note that this logic identifies not only the dissent-
ing individual conscience as an opponent, but any development 
deviating from the party line.
Of course, such deviations occurred constantly. Economic and 
social reality is recalcitrant, and can’t be designed at the draw-
ing board following a few simple principles. From the outset, 
the communist project faced great economic difficulties. Hence, 
anyone seen to be involved in the economic difficulties, whether 
they had brought those difficulties about intentionally or merely 
accidentally, was also identified as an enemy of the system, a relic 
of the past. The same was true of anyone providing the slightest 
evidence of clinging to the “bourgeois” conception of private 
property. This explains Manuk’s tragedy and countless other trag-
edies of so-called class enemies, a category of oppression arising 
out of the need to explain the discrepancy between social reality 
and the figments of ideology.
The need for the proletariat to weed out relics of the past was 
a constant worry, indeed a kind of paranoia, of communist states. 
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PAsT wAs A consTAnT 
worrY, indeed A 
Kind of PArAnoiA, of 
communisT sTATes.”
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29   Lenin, The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism (1913), 
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desiring a society devoid of them. By a bewildering paradox, 
precisely the attempt to abolish all societal coercion and the 
state, as the greatest of all evils, led to the establishment of a state 
containing the highest degree of coercion and repression, a true 
and terrible Leviathan. It is to this end that we must cultivate the 
memory of communism, in a variety of ways, theoretical, histori-
cal, and moral, as I have tried to do in this essay. The memory of 
communism suggests the necessity of some coercion, some alien-
ation, in our liberal democracies, in order to avoid the contin-
gency, the calamity of total coercion and alienation, as endured 
by our fellow Europeans in the East.
I say this is a troubling verdict, for if some coercion and alien-
ation is needed to sustain a human society, then this reflects a 
deep flaw in man as a social animal. In addition to paying tribute 
to the dead, the memory of communism helps us understand, 
first, the character of our own, liberal societies, second, our own 
social nature, and third, the limits of all social radicalism, of all 
political theology.35 We should guard against the temptation to 
redeem mankind by political means, a temptation that was at the 
root of communism, and will no doubt return in other forms in 
the future. ≈
Note: This text is based on a lecture delivered at the Romanian Cultural 
Institute in Stockholm on November 4, 2014, to mark the 25th anniver-
sary of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.
references
1   Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, trans. David Macey and Steve 
Corcoran (London: Verso, 2010).
2   The Black Book of Communism, ed. Stéphane Courtois (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997).
3   Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 1206.
4   Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, 1848.
5   Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944—1956 
(New York: Doubleday, 2012).
6   Applebaum discusses these four stages only with respect to three 
countries, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but the pattern is 
comparable to what happened elsewhere.
7   See Dennis Deletant, Ceauşescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in 
Romania, 1965—1989 (London: Hurst, 1998), ch. 2.
8   Constituţia Republicii Populâre Romane 1948, http://www.constitutia.ro/
const1948.htm.
9   Ibid.
10   Herta Müller, The Appointment, trans. Michael Hulse and Philip Boehm 
(New York: Metropolitan, 2001).
11   Cicerone Ioniţoiu, Victimele terorii comuniste: Arestaţi, torturaţi, 
întemniţaţi, ucişi [The victims of communist terror: Arrested, tortured, 
imprisoned, killed] (Bucharest: Editura Maşina de scris, 2000).
12    Ibid., 269; http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/
ioanitoiu/dictionar_hijkl/k/dictionark_1.pdf.
13   Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 335.
14   Markus Bauer, “Das Piteşti-Experiment: Bei ihrer ungehinderten 
lecture
